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Abstract
Uncontrollability has been often associated with impaired or rigid cognitive processing. However, perceived stability of 
uncontrollable events modulated some of these detrimental effects on cognition. We investigated whether the experience of 
sequential control loss and restoration can enhance cognitive flexibility. We manipulated uncontrollability using a concept 
formation procedure that entailed either only unsolvable tasks (control deprivation condition), unsolvable tasks followed by 
solvable ones (control restoration condition) or only solvable tasks (control condition). To assess cognitive flexibility, we 
used a task-switching procedure that incorporated social categories. In Experiment 1 participants categorized people based 
on gender or age, and in Experiment 2 and 3 based on gender or social roles. Participants showed more flexibility in control 
restoration than in control deprivation condition. Additionally, in Experiments 2 and 3 this effect was mainly pronounced in 
the condition where the task evoked more cognitive conflict. We discuss the motivational underpinnings of unstable experi-
ences of control loss and restoration.
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Decades of research on control deprivation leave us with an 
image of the control-deprived person as a passive victim of 
threatening circumstances. Jack Brehm (1993), when ques-
tioning the generalizability of learned helplessness effects, 
used the example of how animals adapt to their natural 
habitat, when basic resources such as food are threatened. 
According to Brehm, this observation reveals that when 
necessary, animals and humans can act flexibly to restore 
control. We can draw parallels with this observation to our 
everyday experiences, where a complete lack of control, 
so a situation in which the outcomes of our actions do not 
depend at all upon our intentions, seems like an exception 
rather than the rule. People are able to maintain their per-
ception of control even in situations that objectively and 
largely restrain their control over the environment (Langer 
1975). Even amongst the healthy majority of individuals, 
their sense of control is often lost and regained many times 
a day, and across multiple domains of life. Such fluctua-
tions of control loss and restoration might not only influence 
our thinking about possible sources of uncontrollability but 
also the way we perceive and categorize the world and other 
people. Taking this dynamic view of control deprivation, in 
the present research we ask how the sequence and duration 
of one’s control depriving and enhancing experiences influ-
ences cognitive flexibility particularly applied in a socially 
relevant domain.
Cognitive flexibility, understood as the ability to shift 
between mental sets, plays a key role in people’s lives 
(Meiran 2010). Flexibility is not only essential for effec-
tive self-regulation, goal pursuit and individual well-being, 
but it is also considered fundamental for socially grounded 
processes, such as re-categorization, which can favor ste-
reotype change (Dovidio et al. 2006; Gocłowska and Crisp 
2013; Kashdan and Rottenberg 2010; Marien et al. 2012). 
People’s flexibility can diminish when such motives as 
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personal control or certainty are threatened thereby lower-
ing people’s cognitive capacity and activating a defensive 
and rigid information processing style (Jonas et al. 2014; 
von Hecker and Sedek 1999). For example, threats to control 
motivation were shown to increase rigidity, operationalized 
as increased reliance on ethnocentric beliefs and ingroup 
biases (Fritsche et al. 2013).
While there is empirical evidence showing that threats 
to control can decrease flexible thought, to the best of our 
knowledge, no research has examined the effects of con-
trol restoration on flexibility. This issue is important since 
real-life occurrences of control deprivation are often fol-
lowed by instances of control restoration. Thus, studying 
such unstable situations (vs. stable situations of control 
deprivation) captures people’s everyday experiences and 
might help to explain why despite repeated failures, peo-
ple do not generally give up when task conditions become 
increasingly difficult. Also, aiming to understand if and how 
control restoration can reestablish flexible thinking, paves 
way for interventions aimed at control-deprived individuals 
(e.g. unemployed people). Finally, we claim that studying 
the potentially beneficial effects of control restoration on 
switching between social categories is important and ecolog-
ically valid in the context of a diverse social environment. To 
address these important issues, we explored whether restor-
ing control could prevent the detrimental effects of control 
deprivation on cognitive flexibility.
(Un)controllability and cognitive 
performance
In his pioneering work, Martin Seligman (1975) described 
the destructive impact of control deprivation on cogni-
tive performance. In situations of control deprivation, he 
observed, when behavioral outcomes are no longer contin-
gent upon actions taken, organisms suffer from cognitive 
deficits (ability to discover new response-outcome con-
tingencies), motivational deficits (decreased tendency to 
initiate new behaviors) and affective deficits (arousal and 
negative emotions). Consequently, stable and prolonged 
situations of control deprivation lead to the development 
of learned helplessness (Seligman 1975). Later work by 
Sedek and Kofta (1990; also see Kofta and Sedek 1999) 
demonstrated that prolonged uncontrollability experiences 
increased feelings of uncertainty that cannot be reduced, 
and create a state of cognitive exhaustion, accompanied by 
impaired learning to avoid aversive stimuli. In follow up 
studies, experiences of control deprivation diminished peo-
ple’s ability to integrate new information into meaningful 
mental models (Kofta 1993; von Hecker and Sędek 1999), 
and impaired attentional control and selectivity (Bukowski 
et al. 2015; Kofta and Sedek 1998). Bukowski et al. (2015) 
found that under conditions of prolonged and stable control 
deprivation, people attended to goal-irrelevant information, 
which reduced their capacity to apply goal-driven attentional 
control on a subsequent task. Importantly, their studies also 
revealed that temporary control restoration experiences 
could prevent such detrimental effects of control depriva-
tion on attentional control.
Still, some research has shown that control deprivation to 
a small extent can lead to more effort expenditure, cognitive 
mobilization, and more systematic information processing 
(Mikulincer 1994; Pittman and D’Agostino 1989; Wortman 
and Brehm 1975). In these studies, the effects of control 
deprivation were moderated by externally provided prob-
ability of success, or the subjective expectancy of control in 
participants (Mikulincer 1988; Pittman and Pittman 1979; 
Roth and Kubal 1975). In addition, the precondition of those 
beneficial effects was that the control deprivation experience 
was very short (i.e. one unsolvable task) which led to greater 
accuracies on Raven task matrices and more efficient cue 
utilization on other problem-solving tasks, including ana-
grams, and digit-letter substitution (Mikulincer et al. 1989). 
However, in other studies short periods of uncontrollability 
did not change the level of performance in comparison to 
controllable conditions, whereas prolonged uncontrollabil-
ity exposure reduced performance accuracy, but not effort 
expenditure, thus representing the motivational component 
of behavior (Ric and Scharnitzky 2003).
Based on previous research we know that prolonged and 
stable control deprivation experiences impair cognitive 
performance. But to the best of our knowledge, a lot less 
research has been conducted on the stability of uncontrol-
lability experiences. Some predictions as to how control sta-
bility could affect cognitive performance can be retrieved 
from earlier research on stable vs. unstable attributions of 
control. Mikulincer (1988, 1990) argued that appraisals of 
control stability play a key role in predicting how control 
deprivation affects performance. In his studies, stability was 
either explicitly manipulated, by encouraging participants to 
attribute the outcome of their activity to stable or unstable 
causes, or people’s dispositional attribution style (stable or 
unstable attributions of failure) was measured. Mikulincer 
(1988) found that following a helplessness training proce-
dure (used as a control deprivation manipulation) partici-
pants who made stable (vs. unstable) attributions of their 
failures (independently of whether these attributions were 
based on their individual attributional style or induced by 
the experimenter) were worse at problem solving. These 
findings revealed the importance of stability appraisals for 
cognitive performance and suggest that performance decre-
ments due to control deprivation may depend on the percep-
tion of possible change in the chain of uncontrollable events 
directed towards control restoration.
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Hence, it can be asserted that attributions of stabil-
ity influence problem solving abilities. However, can an 
experience of unstable uncontrollability by itself produce 
beneficial effects for cognitive processing? To answer this 
question, it is important to investigate how control restora-
tion experiences that follow control deprivation, impact per-
formance relative to stable control deprivation experiences. 
Therefore, in our research we will focus on the consequences 
of control deprivation and control restoration on cognitive 
flexibility, which enables people to adapt to new situations 
and to change existing habits of thought.
Control restoration and cognitive flexibility
Why would the control restoration experience influence cog-
nitive flexibility? We will now refer to two potential basic 
motivational and cognitive mechanisms that could account 
for this type of effect. One possible explanation refers to 
the impact of an unstable and uncertain environment on 
people’s cognitive processing. Recent findings in basic 
research on attention and perception show that unexpected 
changes in ongoing events that induce some degree of dif-
ficulty and uncertainty can also trigger additional processing 
and boost performance (Rosner et al. 2015; Swallow and 
Jiang 2010). Random and unpredictable task settings also 
enhanced involvement of cognitive control in a task-switch-
ing paradigm (Tornay and Milan 2001). Another strand of 
research (longitudinal) revealed that people who grew up in 
unpredictable social environments performed better in tasks 
involving shifting abilities (i.e. switching) but worse at tasks 
involving cognitive inhibition (Mittal et al. 2015). Therefore, 
it seems that rapidly changing environmental conditions that 
induce some degree of subjective uncertainty can boost a 
form of cognitive adaptation related to greater alertness, 
attentional orienting to changes and more flexible switch-
ing between tasks or mental sets.
Still, the motivational underpinnings of these effects 
remain unclear. Control loss and restoration sequences do 
not merely depict a general change in the environment but 
they signal goal progress (i.e. restoration of a threatened 
motive) and provide positive feedback on one’s course of 
action. On the contrary, stable loss of control ought to signal 
that all efforts to restore control would be futile and could 
lead to disengagement of cognitive effort (Brehm and Self 
1989). A broad range of research related to the motivational 
intensity theory showed that individuals tend to mobilize 
exactly the amount of energy that is required to succeed 
in a particular task and the difficulty of the said task deter-
mines energy investment (Wright 2008). Cognitive effort 
investment is thus minimised when it is impossible to solve 
the ongoing task or problem despite trying hard to do so. 
However, in some conditions participants invest more effort 
than required in a task and do not fully disengage even if 
task success is impossible; which is inconsistent with the 
basic idea of energy conservation (Stanek and Richter 2016). 
When task difficulty is unclear, effort devoted to solve a task 
might actually increase depending on the importance of suc-
cess, that is, when, success importance is high and positive 
mood is induced (Richter 2015; Richter and Gendolla 2009). 
Thus, it seems possible that even in unstable task conditions 
(i.e. involving sudden changes in task solvability) cognitive 
effort devoted to a particular task could potentially increase 
leading to better cognitive performance.
The next question to address would be why control resto-
ration experiences would specifically impact those functions 
of cognitive control that are related to cognitive flexibility 
and task-switching. Control restoration results in a sudden 
change in perceived controllability (i.e. solvability of the 
tasks) which could stimulate cognitive effort expenditure 
and enhance approach motivation. Thus, one explanation 
of the flexibility-inducing effects of restored perceived con-
trol could refer to the motivational mechanism based on 
low-intensity motivational states that are evoked when pro-
longed problem-solving activity leads to rewarding results 
(i.e., goal attainment). The effects of enhanced cognitive 
control after reward processing were recently more inten-
sively studied, indicating common neural underpinnings of 
rewards processing, performance monitoring, control execu-
tion and action selection related to functioning of the dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex (dACC; see Botvinick and Braver 
2015; Shenav et al. 2013). In the context of perceived lack 
of control, the sudden withdrawal of uncertainty related to 
the missing contingency between intentions and actions, 
itself could serve as a strong rewarding experience thereby 
influencing performance on a consecutive switching task. 
An unexpected goal progress would thus arise from initial 
negative affect (experienced due to control deprivation) 
and substituted with positive affect (due to control resto-
ration) (Gable and Harmon-Jones 2011). Since positive 
affect broadens attention and is beneficial specifically for 
cognitive flexibility, control restoration experiences might 
in turn lead to greater flexibility and enhanced ability to 
switch between task sets (Ashby et al. 1999; Fredrickson 
and Branigan 2005). Previous research showed that approach 
motives bolster attentional flexibility (Friedman and Förster 
2005), and the cognitive mechanism involved in the boost 
of flexibility seems to be based on a broadened attentional 
scope that allows flexible switching between task demands 
(Friedman et al. 2003). Importantly, approach-based, posi-
tive emotional states, related to rewards and incentives were 
shown to increase cognitive flexibility, assessed via various 
task-switching paradigms (Aarts et al. 2011; Kleinsorge and 
Rinkenauer 2012). Thus, a possible explanation of the ben-
eficial effects of control restorative experiences on cogni-
tive flexibility and task-switching refers to approach-based 
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motivation and positive affective states that occur when a 
sense of personal control is restored (Harmon-Jones et al. 
2013).
In sum, those two types of empirical findings directed 
us to develop the assumption that control restoration could 
enhance cognitive flexibility due to increased attention to 
changing environmental (task) conditions and enhanced 
approach-based motivational states. On a subjective level, 
on one hand, these experiences should be accompanied by 
a moderate level of perceived difficulty, uncontrollabil-
ity and uncertainty in task pursuit, and on the other hand, 
by enhanced approach-based positive affect after control 
restoration.
The current research
In this research we investigate the effects of different uncon-
trollability experiences on cognitive flexibility assessed in 
the context of social categorization. Control experiences 
were experimentally induced and later on perceptions of 
personal control were assessed. Perceived personal control 
is operationalized by us as the extent to which the self can 
produce desired (or prevent undesired) outcomes (Skinner 
1995). Across three experiments we manipulated control 
deprivation and restoration using a modified version of a 
well-established uncontrollability inducing procedure, in 
which participants are exposed to a series of solvable or 
unsolvable concept formation tasks (Kofta and Sedek 1999; 
Sedek and Kofta 1990; von Hecker and Sedek 1999). In the 
control deprivation condition, we administered a series of 
unsolvable tasks, whereas in the control restoration condi-
tion a series of unsolvable tasks was followed by a series 
of solvable tasks. We also introduced a control enhancing 
condition that only consisted of a set of solvable tasks. It is 
important to notice that we focused primarily on the tem-
porarily activated accumulating experiences of control or 
lack of control that were evoked by the exposure to solv-
able vs. unsolvable tasks. Previous research showed that 
such experimental manipulations of uncontrollability can 
produce carry over effects to other cognitive processes due 
to changed perceptions of personal control (Bukowski et al. 
2015; Kofta and Sedek 1998). It is not a one-time experi-
ence that later influences cognitive flexibility, but rather the 
change in performance is due to an accumulative experience 
of several attempts to solve the tasks. In control restora-
tion conditions the dynamics resulting from an unexpected 
switch from unsolvable to solvable tasks would result in a 
changed motivational state and broadened cognitive scope.
Cognitive flexibility was measured using a task switch-
ing paradigm, which is widely used to explore this process 
(Monsell 2003). Specifically, we applied a procedure that 
required participants to switch between two different social 
categories, which in previous research served as a valid 
measure of participant’s cognitive flexibility (Kossowska 
et al. 2014; Marzecová et al. 2013). We used a switching 
task that contains socially relevant material (such as human 
faces) because processing of social stimuli is strongly autom-
atized and at the same time involves complex inferential pro-
cesses regarding social category membership (gender, age, 
race etc.). These social categories are related to expectan-
cies that can bias information processing, therefore making 
switching between social categories even more demanding 
with regard to cognitive flexibility than switching between 
socially irrelevant stimuli (Fiske and Taylor 2007; Ito 2011). 
More recent studies additionally proved the validity of using 
task-switching procedures that involve social stimuli (i.e. 
emotional faces) to examine cognitive flexibility processes 
(López-Benítez et al. 2017).
In Experiment 1 participants were switching between 
categories of age and gender. In Experiment 2 and 3 the 
categories applied in the switching procedure were gender 
and social roles. Additionally, the combination of specific 
gender and social role could either be congruent or incon-
gruent with the existing cultural stereotype. We claim that 
switching from stereotype congruent to incongruent trials 
would impose the highest demand on cognitive flexibility 
because it requires contradicting pre-existing expectancies 
about social roles.
We predicted that control restoration experiences (that 
follow prior control deprivation experiences), would be 
associated with greater flexibility of switching between 
social categories than conditions of stable and prolonged 
control deprivation. We also expected that the level of flex-
ibility after control restoration would be comparable to the 
one after a stable control enhancing experience. In other 
words, the relatively lower ability to switch between social 
categories would be observed after uncontrollability experi-
ences, which is the effect of an accumulated and stable (not 
restored) experience of lack of control.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we investigated the impact of experiences of 
control deprivation and control restoration on the flexibility of 
switching between social categories. Uncontrollability experi-
ences were induced via a concept formation procedure that 
consisted of unsolvable and solvable tasks (Sedek and Kofta 
1990). Control restoration was induced by sequentially sub-
stituting the set of unsolvable tasks by a set of solvable tasks. 
Additionally, we examined the effects of different uncontrol-
lability experiences on flexibility while controlling for the role 
of perceived uncertainty, subjective task difficulty and also 
positive and negative affective states. The switching task used 
to assess flexibility included faces that could be categorized 
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based either on their gender or age (Marzecová et al. 2013). 
Face processing stands apart from other types of information 
processing due to the fact that the face proves to be a rich 
source of information about attributes, behavioral intentions 
or trustworthiness about other people (Asch 1946; Keltner 
and Ekman 2003; Todorov 2011). Face categorization and 
inferential processes about traits from facial expressions are 
at the same time very rapid and efficient (Todorov and Uleman 
2003). However, the process of face processing itself is inher-
ently complex and involves several areas of the brain (Bruce 
and Young 1986; Haxby et al. 2000). Gender and age are fun-
damental social categories that are especially relevant in face 
processing and are implicitly processed (Mouchetant-Rostaing 
and Giard 2003). This high automatization of gender and age 
processing should thus make it more difficult to rapidly switch 
between these two categories. In fact previous application of 
gender and age judgments in a switching task indicated that 
it allows to reliably assess differences in cognitive flexibility 
(Marzecová et al. 2013). Thus, in this study we applied the 
social category switching task to assess how lack of control vs. 
control restoration experiences will influence task switching 
efficiency on socially relevant material.
Method
Participants
Based on previous research that involved similar experimen-
tal procedures we sought to recruit 75 participants (Marze-
cova et al. 2013; Bukowski et al. 2015). Seventy-six partici-
pants (undergraduate students) took part in the experiment in 
exchange for course credits. Data of two participants could not 
be recorded due to technical problems and had to be excluded 
from the sample (randomly assigned to the control and control 
deprivation conditions). Two participants failed to follow the 
instructions in the social category switching task and obtained 
an accuracy rate close to chance (52% of accurate responses) 
and were therefore also excluded (randomly assigned to the 
control restoration condition). Thus, in the final analyses, 
seventy-two people were included (59 women and 13 men, 
Mage 20.0; SD = 1.49), twenty-five participants in the control 
condition, twenty-three in the control deprivation condition 
and twenty-four in the control restoration condition. A priori 
power analyses were not performed. Therefore, we conducted 
a sensitivity analysis using G*power (Faul et al. 2007). Results 
showed that with this sample size (N = 72) the minimum effect 
size that could have been detected for α = 0.5, and 1 − β = 0.80, 
for 3 groups (experimental conditions) is f = 0.37 (minimum 
detectable effect).
Materials and measures
Control manipulation
To induce experiences of uncontrollability and control we 
used the Informational Helplessness Training (IHT). The 
training was based on the original procedure developed by 
Sedek and Kofta (1990), in which informational helpless-
ness (uncontrollability) was evoked via a concept-formation 
procedure. The IHT procedure consisted of a series of six 
discrimination problems presented one after another. Each 
problem was composed of 12 trials each, and on each trial 
one figure was presented on the screen. Across all trials, 
figures varied on five dimensions: (1) size (small or large), 
(2) shape (triangle or circle), (3) surface (plain or striped), 
(4) position of a line (at the top or bottom of the figure), and 
(5) size of the letter ‘r’ in the middle of the figure (small or 
large). The participants’ task was to identify the diagnostic 
feature of the figures in each discrimination problem. For 
example, in one set of 12 trials, the common feature might 
be a small “r” and in the other, a line on the top of the fig-
ure. Participants were informed that all tasks were solvable 
and that they could resolve the tasks, that is, identify the 
diagnostic feature of the figures to be discovered (e.g., the 
small “r” or the line on the top in the above examples) by 
using the information (i.e., ‘yes’ or ‘no’) accompanying the 
figure presented on the screen. The instructions explained 
that ‘yes’ means presence (e.g., the presented circle with 
the small “r” letter has the diagnostic feature), whereas ‘no’ 
means absence of the target feature in the figure (e.g., the 
triangle with the large “R” letter does not have the diagnostic 
feature). After each problem completion, a list of ten features 
(i.e., possible solutions) was presented to participants, and 
participants were asked to indicate the solution by pressing 
the corresponding key on the computer keyboard, thereby 
identifying the target feature. Importantly, participants were 
not informed about their success/failure after the completion 
of consecutive problems in either condition. In the control 
deprivation condition, the sequence of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ was 
arranged in such a way that each possible hypothesis of a 
problem solution received 50% confirmatory and 50% non-
confirmatory evidence. Therefore, in the control deprivation 
condition, it was not possible to solve any of the tasks (i.e., 
control deprivation). In the control condition participants 
received information that allowed them to solve the tasks 
accurately, that is, ‘yes’ appeared when the target feature 
was present in the figure (i.e., when the figure had the small 
“r” in our example) and ‘no’ appeared when the opposite 
feature (i.e., large “R”) was present. Hence, all the tasks 
were potentially solvable. After a sample task, participants 
were asked by the program whether they understood the 
instructions and continued. Participants were assigned to 
one of the three conditions. In the control condition, all six 
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concept-formation tasks presented to the participants were 
solvable; in the control deprivation condition, none of the 
six tasks were solvable; and in the control restoration condi-
tion, the first three problems were unsolvable and the second 
sequence of three problems was solvable. In neither con-
dition participants received feedback on their performance 
(success or failure). Lack of feedback is a specific feature of 
this informational helplessness induction procedure, which 
was developed based on the classical Hiroto and Seligman 
behavioral helplessness training (1975), in order to examine 
the impact of irreducible uncertainty on task performance 
(Kofta and Sedek 1999). The informational helplessness 
procedure was proven to strongly affect cognitive perfor-
mance, as well as motivational and emotional processes 
(Kofta and Sedek 1998; Sedek and Kofta 1990). Since we 
were interested in the effects of accumulating experiences 
of uncontrollability related to the inability to formulate and 
verify the accuracy of predictions, we decided to incorporate 
this procedure to test this process since it was most applica-
ble to our research. Also, in the control restoration condition 
we studied the role of a rewarding experience that followed 
the introduction of solvable tasks on cognitive performance. 
Including additional feedback to the procedure might disrupt 
those sequential effects because random feedback might be 
perceived as rewarding in some circumstances. Excluding 
feedback in the manipulation allowed us to omit this con-
found and control for the externally rewarding stimuli.
Manipulation check
Three questions measured perceptions of accuracy, difficulty 
and control after the manipulation (How accurate do you 
think you were in doing the tasks? How difficult did you find 
the tasks? To what extent did you feel that you had control 
over your performance?). Participants answered using a 
7-point scale (e.g., from 1—absolutely no control, to 7—
full control).
Emotions and uncertainty
After the control manipulation task, we measured par-
ticipant’s mood using the Multiple Affect Adjective Check 
List-Revised (MAACL-R; Zuckerman and Lubin 1985), 
which measures positive (happy, joyful, pleasant, merry; 
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89) and negative emotional states 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.96). The scale differentiates negative 
emotional states in depression (e.g., sad, depressed; 8 items, 
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.93), anxiety (e.g., worried, anxious; 4 
items, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88), and hostility (e.g., angry, 
hostile; 4 items, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.94). Additionally, we 
measured uncertainty using two items (uncertain, disori-
ented; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78).
Social category switching task (SCST)
To test participant’s ability to switch between different social 
categories, we introduced the social category switching task. 
This task was previously used to assess differences in cogni-
tive flexibility (Marzecová et al. 2013). In this task, partici-
pants categorized pictures of human faces according to one 
of two social categories: gender (female vs. male) or age 
(young vs. old). Eight black-and-white photographs, depict-
ing a young female, an older female, a young male, and an 
older male (two pictures for each category) were selected 
from The center for vital longevity face database (Minear 
and Park 2004). All of the photographs had the same proper-
ties (7.41 cm width and 6.74 cm height) and were displayed 
in the center of the screen. An additional cue, in the form 
of a colored frame surrounding the picture (green or pur-
ple), appeared in the middle of the screen. The cue informed 
participants what categorization rule (either gender or age 
categorization) is applicable on a given trial. The color-cat-
egorization rule combination was counterbalanced.
Each trial in the procedure began with the presentation of 
a fixation cross for 1000 ms. Afterward, the target picture, 
framed with either the green or the purple colored frame, 
was presented in the middle of the screen. The cue and the 
target remained on the screen until the participant responded 
or for a maximum duration of 3000 ms. After incorrect 
responses, a beep was presented and the next trial followed 
after 1500 ms (see Fig. 1). Participants responded using both 
hands. The “z” and “m” keys were used to respond to the 
gender task, whereas the age task was performed with “x” 
and “n” keys. The matching of keys to category exemplars 
was also counterbalanced across participants. Participants 
task was to categorize the target as man/woman or young/
old in each case. They were given written instructions on the 
screen explaining the matching of keys and the tasks. The 
task contained 8 practice trials, followed by four experimen-
tal blocks of 80 trials each. The stimuli were presented in 
a random order to each participant. RTs and accuracy were 
recorded in order to calculate switching costs as dependent 
variables.
Questionnaire data was gathered before the manipulation 
and a test version of an open-ended social categorization 
measure was administered at the very end of the study.1
1 A need for cognitive closure scale was applied before the manipu-
lation to control for its moderating impact on our variables of inter-
est. No moderating effects were found. Additionally, an open-ended, 
paper–pencil measure of social categorization (participants were 
asked to list all the ways they could think of categorizing others and 
write them down on a blank sheet of paper) was administered as the 
last measure in the study. It did not have any impact on the procedure 
and the results were non-conclusive, thus they are not reported in the 
text.
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Design and data analysis
Our main hypothesis was related to the impact of different 
uncontrollability experiences on the efficiency of switching 
between social categories. Therefore, firstly we calculated 
switching costs, that is the difference in reaction times and 
response accuracies between switch vs. no switch trials (i.e. 
when the task on the previous and the current trial is dif-
ferent vs. when the task repeats) as an index of cognitive 
flexibility (Monsell 2003). Further on, we analyzed the dif-
ferences between the three experimental conditions (control 
deprivation, control restoration and control) with regard to 
switching costs.
It was also possible to apply more intricate level of analy-
sis to the task-switching procedure which not only takes into 
account whether the same or different task was performed 
as in the previous trials (e.g., whether participants must 
respond to age on the previous and to gender on the current 
trial, or they have to respond to age on both), but also the 
changes in the attributes of the target stimulus (e.g. young 
woman on the previous trial and old woman in the current 
one, or young woman in both). In line with the feature bind-
ing approach (Hommel 1998), we propose to analyze jointly 
the effects of task repetition and stimulus repetition (indi-
cated by the repetition of stimulus attributes). This allows 
us to differentiate between the cost in switching responses 
for the same stimulus (complete repetition) and switching 
responses to a partially different stimulus (partial repetition), 
or a completely different stimulus (complete alternation), 
which provide an additional test for our hypothesis (Schmidt 
and Liefooghe 2016). Taking this distinction into account 
allows us not only to check for the task switch effects but 
look more specifically into those task conditions requiring 
larger flexibility. Note that changing (vs. repeating) response 
will be more demanding when exactly the same stimulus 
is repeated (e.g., a young woman), but in the previous tri-
als participants must give a response (e.g., “young”), and 
in the current trial a different one (e.g., “woman”). Since 
those trials are especially demanding in terms of cognitive 
flexibility, they constitute an important additional test of our 
hypothesis. Therefore, we checked for the effects of con-
dition on switching costs in interaction with the task and 
stimulus repetition type. Thus, we conducted a full repeated 
measure ANOVA (rANOVA) within a 3 (uncontrollability) 
× 2 (task) × 3 (stimulus repetition) mixed design with per-
sonal control experience manipulated between participants 
(control deprivation vs. control restoration vs. control), and 
task (gender vs. age categorization), and stimulus repetition 
(complete alternation vs. complete repetition vs. partial rep-
etition) manipulated within-participants. The task variable 
refers to whether participants had to categorize the stimuli 
based on its gender (male, female) or age (young, old). The 
stimulus repetition refers to the repetition of features across 
trials such that complete alternation implied that the trial dif-
fered from the previous one (e.g.,  Trialn−1 = young woman; 
 Trialn = old man). Complete repetition implies that the two 
category dimensions repeated (e.g.,  Trialn−1 = young woman; 
 Trialn = young woman). Finally, partial repetition implies that 
Fig. 1  Schematic illustration 
of the social category switch-
ing task procedure. Sequence 
of events representative for the 
complete stimulus repetition 
and category switch condition. 
The sample image is reproduced 
from the center for vital longev-
ity face database (Minear and 
Park 2004), downloaded from 
http://aging mind.utdal las.edu/
stimu li/faced b
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one category dimension changed whereas the other repeated 
across two trials (e.g.,  Trialn−1 = young woman;  Trialn = old 
woman).
Results
Manipulation checks
The three manipulation check questions were analyzed sep-
arately. An univariate ANOVA test revealed a significant 
effect of control manipulation on perceived control ratings 
(F(2,69) = 75.51, p < .001, η2p = 0.69). Planned compari-
sons using Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons 
revealed that perceived control was higher in the control 
restoration group, compared with the control deprivation 
condition (p < .001, d = 2.68), and they both scored lower 
compared to the control condition (p = .002, d = − 0.97; 
p < .001, d = − 3.56, respectively), which proved that the 
uncontrollability manipulation worked well. There was also 
a significant effect of manipulation on perceived accuracy 
(F(2,69) = 118.53, p < .001, η2p = 0.78). Perceived accu-
racy ratings were higher for the control restoration condi-
tion than for the control deprivation condition (p < .001, 
d = 2.67) and both differed significantly from the control 
condition (p < .001, d = − 1.78; p < .001, d = − 4.36, respec-
tively). Perceived difficulty of the task was also significantly 
affected by the manipulation (F(2,69) = 42.27, p < .001, η2p 
= 0.55). Perceived difficulty scores were lower for the con-
trol restoration condition than for the control deprivation 
condition (p < .001, d = − 2.01), and again they were both 
significantly different from the control condition (p = .019, 
d = 0.83; p < .001, d = 2.35, respectively) (for descriptive 
statistics see Table 1).
Emotions and uncertainty
We also analyzed the differences in experienced emotions 
using univariate ANOVA analyses. We found significant 
effects of the control manipulation on negative emotions 
(F(2,69) = 3.86, p = .026, η2p = 0.10) as well as positive 
emotions (F(2,69) = 8.84, p < .001, η2p = 0.20). The results 
showed that the control restoration and control depriva-
tion condition did not differ in terms of experienced nega-
tive emotions (p = .125, d = − 0.62) and positive emotions 
(p = .023, d = 0.84), showing more positive emotions in 
the control restoration vs. control deprivation condition. In 
the control deprivation condition participants experienced 
more negative emotions (p = .030, d = 0.71), and less posi-
tive emotions (p < .001, d = − 1.26), compared to the control 
condition. In the control restoration condition, participants 
did not differ significantly from the control condition in 
terms of experienced negative or positive emotions. Addi-
tionally, we found a significant effect of control manipula-
tion on uncertainty ratings (F(2,69) = 16.32, p < .001, η2p 
= 0.32). In the control deprivation condition participants 
experienced a higher level of uncertainty in comparison to 
control restoration (p < .001, d = 1.19) and control conditions 
(p < .001, d = 1.43). The difference between control restora-
tion and control was non-significant (for descriptive statistics 
see Table 1).
Table 1  Means (and standard deviations) for manipulation checks and other experiential measures (emotions and uncertainty)
In experiment 1, 2 and 3
Experiment Condition Manipulation checks Phenomenal experiences
Perceived 
control
Perceived 
accuracy
Perceived 
difficulty
Uncertainty Negative 
emotions
Positive 
emotions
Positive 
high-
approach
Positive low-
approach
Experiment 1 Control 5.64 (1.25) 5.88 (0.93) 2.60 (1.50) 2.32 (1.23) 1.68 (1.26) 4.06 (1.38) – –
Control dep-
rivation
1.83 (0.89) 1.78 (0.95) 5.91 (1.31) 4.52 (1.79) 2.61 (1.36) 2.52 (1.03) – –
Control res-
toration
4.50 (1.10) 4.25 (0.90) 3.63 (0.92) 2.50 (1.34) 1.87 (0.98) 3.55 (1.39) – –
Experiment 2 Control 6.33 (0.82) 6.15 (1.09) 1.94 (1.68) 1.44 (0.68) 1.2 (0.31) 3.35 (0.68) 3.27 (0.80) 3.09 (0.69)
Control dep-
rivation
1.84 (0.81) 1.97 (0.97) 5.53 (1.27) 2.65 (1.17) 1.9 (0.76) 2.9 (0.62) 2.7 (0.79) 2.83 (0.80)
Control res-
toration
4.52 (1.12) 4.26 (1.06) 3.87 (1.45) 1.66 (0.66) 1.42 (0.37) 3.4 (0.53) 3.23 (0.50) 3.34 (0.79)
Experiment 3 Control 5.37 (1.28) 5.53 (1.26) 2.82 (1.50) 1.50 (0.78) 1.3 (0.37) 3.28 (0.68) 3.19 (0.81) 3.05 (0.90)
Control dep-
rivation
1.88 (0.97) 1.64 (1.03) 5.83 (1.03) 2.80 (1.26) 1.84 (0.82) 2.81 (0.62) 2.44 (0.77) 2.92 (0.75)
Control res-
toration
3.74 (1.16) 3.84 (1.23) 4.38 (1.04) 2.05 (1.19) 1.62 (0.79) 2.89 (0.75) 2.55 (0.85) 3.01 (0.89)
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Social category switching task (SCST)
Trials with erroneous and missed responses (i.e., trials in 
which no response was given), or reactions shorter than 200 
and higher than 2000 ms were excluded from the analysis 
of response times to normalize the data distribution (see 
Ratcliff 1993). 2 The first trial of each block was not included 
in the RT and accuracy analyses, since it cannot be coded as 
switch or no switch trial (see Marzecová et al. 2013). Accu-
racy (ACC, mean proportion of correct responses) and mean 
RTs were calculated from all the remaining trials.
Effects of control manipulation
To test for the differences in flexibility of categorization as a 
function of experimental condition, we calculated switching 
costs for response times (mean RTs for switch—no switch 
trials) and accuracy and conducted a one-way ANOVA with 
uncontrollability as the between-subjects factor (control dep-
rivation, control restoration and control). The main effect 
of condition was significant, F(2,69) = 3.73, p = .029, η2p = 
0.10. Pairwise comparisons indicated that participants in the 
control restoration condition had lower switching costs (M 
= 100, SD = 65) than participants in the control deprivation 
condition (M = 145, SD = 63), p = .016, d = − 3.46. Partici-
pants in the control deprivation condition revealed higher 
switching costs than those in the control condition (M = 103, 
SD = 62), p = .025, d = 3.23. The difference between the con-
trol restoration and control conditions was non-significant 
(p = .85). The effect of condition on switching costs was not 
significant in the accuracy measure (F(2,69) = 1.01, p = .37, 
η2p = 0.03). We also calculated a reversed efficiency index 
which is a form of analyzing the response time—accuracy 
trade-off by dividing the RT data by accuracy scores and 
performed an univariate ANOVA on this dependent vari-
able. However, no significant effects were found here as well 
(F(2,69) = 1.34, p = .27, η2p = 0.04).
As described above, in the Social Category Switching 
Task we also analyzed the effects of control manipulation 
as a function of stimulus repetition to obtain a stronger test 
for our predictions regarding the impact of control depriva-
tion vs. restoration on cognitive flexibility. Accordingly, we 
checked for the effects of condition in interaction with the 
task type and repetition type. To do that, we conducted a full 
repeated measures ANOVA with the 3 (uncontrollability) × 
2 (task) × 3 (stimulus repetition) design for RT switching 
costs as the dependent variable. We found a significant 
three-way interaction (F(2,69) = 4.08, p = .021, η2p = 0.11). 
Pairwise comparisons for differences between the control 
restoration vs. control deprivation condition revealed sig-
nificantly lower switching costs in the gender categorization 
task (i.e., when participants switched from age to gender) 
only for complete repetition (p = .045) or partial repetition 
trials (p = .017). Additionally, when switching from gender 
to age and in complete alternation trials, participants in the 
control deprivation condition showed higher switching costs 
relative to the control condition (p = .033).
The 3 (uncontrollability) × 2 (task) × 3 (stimulus repeti-
tion) interaction was not significant for the accuracy measure 
(F < 1).
Discussion
Experiment 1 revealed that a stable control deprivation 
experience decreases cognitive flexibility, but when control 
deprivation changes and initial lack of control is substituted 
with a sense of exerted control, then participants behave 
in a more flexible way. This beneficial effect in the form 
of decreased switching cost (changing between gender and 
age as a categorization rule) could be observed in the con-
trol restoration (vs. control deprivation) condition. Ancil-
lary analyses revealed that the difference between unstable 
and stable control deprivation conditions was most strongly 
pronounced in more demanding task settings, in which 
participants had to subsequently categorize the same face 
based on two different rules (e.g., when participants saw 
the same young woman twice and had to categorize her as 
a young person first, but then, following a rule switch on 
the following trial, they had to categorize her as a woman). 
Prolonged, control enhancing experience produced the 
same effects as the control restoration experience in terms 
of assessed flexibility. Thus, the results of this experiment 
confirmed our prediction that control restoration, as well as 
control enhancement, buffer against the cognitively harmful 
effects of lacking control. Additional, subjective measures 
applied after control manipulation showed that participants 
in the control restoration condition experienced a moderate 
level of perceived difficulty and uncontrollability, and lower 
uncertainty relatively to the control deprivation condition. 
Thus, a high level of irreducible uncertainty may be a cru-
cial factor leading to decreased cognitive performance after 
prolonged and stable control deprivation (Kofta and Sedek 
1999). Additionally, our control restoration manipulation 
effectively reduced uncertainty to a level comparable with 
the control condition. Control restoration was also accom-
panied by more positive and less negative affective states 
relative to the control deprivation condition (but similar as in 
the control condition). Therefore, it seems plausible that the 
lack of differences in performance between control restoring 
2 RT data in the social category switching task was normally distrib-
uted, as indicated by the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test for the switching 
cost measure, D(74) = 0.061, p = .20. Tests performed for each experi-
mental and task condition separately also confirmed a normal distri-
bution of the results (p > .05).
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and control enhancing conditions could be due to decreased 
uncertainty and more positive, approach related affect. Still, 
the type of affect measure applied in this experiment did 
not allow us to distinguish between high and low approach 
affective states.
Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 indicated that prolonged con-
trol deprivation lowers the ability to flexibly switch between 
categorization levels, whereas a control restoration expe-
rience successfully eliminates this deteriorative effect. In 
Experiment 2 we aimed at replicating and extending this 
finding by applying a more complex switching procedure 
as a dependent measure, which would not only require to 
change categorization rules but also would incorporate ste-
reotype congruent and incongruent information. Research 
on processing of stereotypical information reveals that ste-
reotype incongruent information engages executive control 
and elicits cognitive conflict based on stimulus—response 
incompatibility (Bartholow and Dicker 2008; Kleiman et al. 
2014; Payne 2005). Perception of people in gender counter-
stereotypical roles (vs. stereotypical roles) evoked greater 
activity of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; 
Quadflieg et al. 2011). The DLPFC is generally engaged 
in complex cognitive tasks that require maintaining task 
objectives and overcoming a habitual or dominant response 
(Knutson et al. 2007). Inhibitory control is engaged during 
person perception when participants were asked to ignore 
stereotypic associations evoked by stereotypical gender 
roles (Quadflieg et al. 2011). Based on this research, we 
assumed that switching between stereotype congruent and 
incongruent gender—social roles pairings will constitute 
the highest demands on cognitive conflict resolution pro-
cesses. Since control deprivation affects the efficiency of 
attentional control, we expected that a stable experience of 
uncontrollability will also influence the flexibility of switch-
ing between social categories and would mostly be observed 
on stereotype incongruent trials, that is, when highest levels 
of cognitive conflict are induced. However, control restora-
tion experience would diminish those detrimental effects on 
switching abilities. Since the overall difficulty of the task has 
been increased in comparison to the task-switching proce-
dure used in Experiment 1, we focused here more directly on 
the accuracy and efficiency measures of performance related 
to the resolution of the speed—accuracy trade-off.
As in Experiment 1, we measured perceived uncertainty 
and difficulty in order to assess the role of uncertainty 
reduction as a potential mechanism modulating the effi-
ciency of switching between social categories. Addition-
ally, we assessed low and high approach positive and nega-
tive affect to examine whether motivational intensity (i.e. 
approach-based positive affect; Harmon-Jones et al. 2013) 
accounts for the predicted higher flexibility of social catego-
rization after control restoration (vs. control deprivation).
Method
Participants
Based on previous research that used the same control 
deprivation manipulation (Bukowski et al. 2015) and the 
Social Category Switching Task (Marzecova et al. 2013) we 
determined the expected effect size at f = 0.31. Sample size 
was determined using G*Power (Faul et al. 2007), α-error 
probability was set on 0.05. According to this analysis a 
minimum sample size of 105 participants was required to 
obtain a 0.80 power effect.3 We recruited a sample of one 
hundred-and-three participants. Undergraduate students, 
who took part in this experiment, received financial com-
pensation of 10 PLN (approximately $2.50) for participation. 
One participant failed to complete the manipulation. Five 
participants were excluded before the analyses, based on the 
manipulation checks, which revealed that they were either 
aware that the tasks were unsolvable in the control depri-
vation condition (three participants), or did not follow the 
instructions and failed to resolve any of the three solvable 
tasks in the control restoration condition (two participants). 
On the gender-role switching task, one participant obtained 
an accuracy rate that was not different from a chance level 
response tendency (52% of accurate responses) and was also 
excluded from further analyses. The final sample size was 
therefore ninety-six (61 females and 35 males, Mage = 21.91, 
SD = 1.89) that included thirty-three participants in the con-
trol condition, thirty-two in the control deprivation condition 
and thirty-one in the control restoration condition.
Materials and measures
Control manipulation
We used the same IHT procedure as in Experiment 1 to 
induce experiences of control deprivation, control restora-
tion or to enhance control.
Manipulation check
The effectiveness of manipulation was measured by the 
same three questions as in Experiment 1 plus two additional 
3 We also conducted sensitivity analysis. Results show that with this 
sample size (N = 96) the minimum effect size that we can detect for 
α = 0.5, and 1 − β = 0.80, for 3 groups (experimental conditions) and 
2 number of measurements is f = 0.33 (minimum detectable effect).
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questions that assessed threat or challenge appraisals (Did 
you find this task challenging? Did you find this task threat-
ening?), which participants answered using a 7-point scale 
(ranging from 1—not at all to 7—very much).
Emotion measurement
The participants’ current emotional state after the control 
manipulation was measured using the PANAS scale (Watson 
et al. 1988). Since we were not only interested in the valence 
of the emotions, but also in their motivational intensity 
(especially related to approach vs. avoidance motivation), 
we conducted a factor analysis for positive and negative 
emotions that revealed a three-factor solution for positive 
affective states and a two-factor solution for negative states. 
The results of the factor analysis confirmed the division 
proposed by Harmon-Jones et al. (2009) differentiating 
between low- and high approach affective states. Hence, we 
calculated separate indexes for low-approach positive affect 
(interested, inspired, excited, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.73), 
high-approach positive affect (active, strong, enthusias-
tic, proud, determined, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81) and two 
positive affective states related to alertness (alert, attentive, 
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79). For negative affective states, one 
index included high-avoidance negative affect (jittery, hos-
tile, scared, nervous, afraid) and the other, low-avoidance 
negative affect (guilty, ashamed, distressed).
Gender role switching task (GRST)
Participants were instructed to categorize pictures of people 
based on their gender (male or female) or profession (pro-
totypical male or female). Each picture showed a man or a 
woman in a specific work context (that could be inferred 
based on the target person’s clothes or tools), thereby cre-
ating stereotypical or counter-stereotypical gender-social 
role combinations. We selected 32 gender stereotypical 
and counter-stereotypical pictures from the base created by 
Quadflieg and colleagues (Quadflieg et al. 2011). We used 
16 pictures of males and 16 pictures of females, with 8 pic-
tures of stereotypical roles and 8 of counter-stereotypical 
roles within each gender category. Additionally, we used 
four different pictures for the practice session. The task con-
sisted of 8 practice trials of social role categorization (they 
were asked to indicate typically male or female professions), 
8 practice sessions for the gender categorization (male vs. 
female categorization), 8 combined categorization trials 
(switching between social role and gender) and four experi-
mental blocks of 64 trials each (combined categorization 
rules), resulting in 256 trials overall.
Each trial in the procedure began with the presentation of 
a gray background in the place where the target picture was 
going to appear for 1000 ms. Afterward, the target picture, 
framed with either the green or the purple colored frame, 
was presented in the middle of the screen. The cue and the 
target remained on the screen until the participant responded 
or for a maximum duration of 3000 ms. After incorrect 
responses, a beep was presented and the next trial followed 
after 1500 ms. Participants were instructed to press “m” and 
“z” for one categorization rule or “n” and “x” keys for the 
other. The meaning of a particular rule was indicated by the 
color of the frame around the picture (green or purple). The 
color-categorization rule matching, as well as the response 
mapping, were counterbalanced across participants.
Questionnaire data was gathered before the manipula-
tion and an open-ended social categorization measure was 
administered at the end of the study.4
Design and data analysis
As in Experiment 1. That is, the response times and accuracy 
rates were analyzed in an ANOVA with a repeated measures 
design. Additionally, switching costs (the difference between 
switch vs. repetition trials) were calculated and analyzed 
for each condition. We mainly focused on the comparisons 
between the control deprivation and restoration group, also 
taking into account the effects of control deprivation and 
restoration in contrast to the control group.
The experiment employed a 3 × 2 mixed design with type 
of uncontrollability experience manipulated between sub-
jects (control deprivation vs. control restoration vs. control) 
and congruency (congruent vs. incongruent gender—role 
pairings) measured as a within-subject variable. Switching 
costs were the dependent measure. The Congruency factor 
referred to whether the person appearing in each trial had 
a gender congruent (e.g., male firefighter) or incongruent 
(e.g., female firefighter) role based on socially shared gender 
stereotypes.
Results
Manipulation checks
There was a significant effect of control manipulation on 
perceived control (F(2,93) = 193.93, p < .001, η2p = 0.81). 
Participants in the control restoration condition perceived 
having significantly more control than in the control dep-
rivation condition (p < .001, d = 2.74) and less than in the 
control condition (p < .001, d = − 1.84). We also compared 
4 Gender identification and system justification scales were applied 
before the manipulation to control for their moderating impact on our 
variables of interest. No moderating effects were found. Additionally, 
an open-ended, paper–pencil measure of social categorization was 
administered at the end of the study. No effects of manipulation were 
found.
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the control deprivation with the control condition and found 
lower scores of perceived control (p < .001, d = − 5.51). 
There was a significant effect of manipulation also on per-
ceived accuracy (F(2,93) = 130.94, p < .001, η2p = 0.74) and 
perceived difficulty of the task (F(2,93) = 46.06, p < .001, 
η2p = 0.51). Participants in the control restoration condition 
reported higher perceived accuracy (p < .001, d = 2.25) but 
more difficulty (p < .001, d = − 1.22) than in the control dep-
rivation one. Control deprivation manipulation generated a 
lower perceived accuracy in comparison to control condition 
(p < .001, d = − 4.05) but higher scores of perceived diffi-
culty (p < .001, d = 2.41). In the control restoration condition 
participants also rated their perceived accuracy as lower than 
in the control condition (p < .001, d = − 1.76, respectively) 
and assessed the perceived difficulty of the task as higher 
(p < .001, d = 1.23). The results proved the efficiency of the 
uncontrollability manipulation.
Emotions and uncertainty
We focused on comparing control restoration with depriva-
tion conditions with respect to emotional states induced by 
the manipulation, since our predictions mainly concerned 
differences between those two groups. The main effect 
of manipulation on negative emotions (F(2,93) = 14.82, 
p < .001, η2p = 0.24) as well as on positive emotions was 
significant (F(2,93) = 6.29, p = .003, η2p = 0.12). Partici-
pants in the control restoration condition experienced less 
negative, and more positive emotions in comparison to 
the control deprivation condition (p = .002, d = − 0.80 and 
p = .006, d = 0.87, respectively). Importantly, participants in 
the control restoration condition scored higher than the con-
trol deprivation condition in low-approach positive emotions 
(p = .012, d = 0.64) as well as in high-approach positive emo-
tions (p = .013, d = 0.80). Additionally, we found that expe-
rienced uncertainty was lower in the control restoration than 
in the control deprivation condition (p < .001, d = − 1.04) 
(for all descriptive statistics see Table 1).
Gender role switching task (GRST)
As in the SCST trials with erroneous and missed responses 
(i.e., trials in which no response was given), or reactions 
shorter than 200 and higher than 2000 ms were excluded 
from the analysis of response times (see Ratcliff 1993).5 
The first trial of each block for RT and accuracy measures 
was excluded, since it cannot be coded as switch or repeti-
tion trial for further analyses (see Marzecová et al. 2013). 
Accuracy and RT scores were means calculated from all the 
remaining trials.
Effects of control manipulation To test the specific hypoth-
esis regarding differences in flexibility of social categori-
zation as a function of uncontrollability, we conducted a 
one-way ANOVA with uncontrollability as the between-
subjects factor and switching costs as the dependent 
variable. The effect of control manipulation on reaction 
times switching costs was not significant (F(2,93) = 1.08, 
p = .344, η2p = 0.02), similar to the two-way interaction 
between uncontrollability and congruency (F(2,93) = 1.04, 
p = .358, η2p = 0.02). However, there was a significant main 
effect of control manipulation on switching costs for the 
accuracy measure (F(2,93) = 4.65, p = .012, η2p = 0.09). 
Planned comparisons revealed that switching costs were 
significantly lower in the control restoration condition (M 
= 0.016, SD = 0.027), in comparison to the control dep-
rivation one (M = 0.046, SD = 0.056; p = .007, d = − 3.75). 
Participants in the control deprivation condition revealed 
higher switching costs than those in the control condition 
(M = 0.020, SD = 0.039; p = .015, d = 3.46). Moreover, the 
switching costs for accuracy of responses were not signifi-
cantly different in the control condition in comparison to the 
control restoration condition (p = .74). The two-way inter-
action between uncontrollability and congruency was not 
significant for accuracies (F (2,93) = 1.42, p = .248, η2p = 
0.03). Thus, the same pattern of results observed with RT in 
Experiment 1 could be observed with the accuracy measure 
in Experiment 2.
Reversed efficiency analysis As in Experiment 1, we wanted 
to test the possibility of a trade-off between response time 
and accuracy that could have occurred in the GRST. We cal-
culated an index of reversed efficiency by dividing average 
reaction times for each task condition, by the correspond-
ing accuracy rates. This index allowed us to estimate how 
well participants dealt with conflict between trying to be 
accurate while responding fast at the same time. The main 
effect of uncontrollability on switching costs was not sig-
nificant (F(2,93) = 2.41, p = .09, η2p = 0.05). However, we 
found a significant uncontrollability × congruency inter-
action, F(2,93) = 3.53, p = .033, η2p = 0.07; see Fig. 2. To 
check whether the efficiency analyses indicated different 
switching costs between uncontrollability conditions as a 
function of stereotype congruency, we performed planned 
comparisons analyzes. For the stereotype-incongruent tri-
als participants in the control restoration condition showed 
lower switching costs in comparison to the control depriva-
tion condition (M = 139, SD = 128 vs. M  = 240, SD = 256), 
p = .025, d = − 3.26. Participants in the control deprivation 
condition revealed higher switching costs than those in the 
control condition (M = 122, SD = 98, p = .008, d = 3.87). 
5 RT data in the gender role switching task was normally distributed, 
as indicated by the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test performed for each 
experimental and task condition (all p’s > .18).
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Performance in the control and control restoration condi-
tions did not differ significantly from each other (p = .694). 
No significant interaction was observed for congruent trials 
(F(2,93) = 0.71, p = .49, η2p = 0.01).
Discussion
In Experiment 2, using a modified switching paradigm to 
study cognitive flexibility, we replicated the main finding 
from Experiment 1 wherein the control restoration experi-
ence lead to higher levels of flexibility in comparison to 
control deprivation. Additionally, in this experiment, partici-
pants were exposed to two types of cognitive conflict, one 
related to switching between social categories, and the other 
related to congruency between those categories and social 
roles. Thus, the overall task difficulty increased in compari-
son to the first experiment. This was reflected in a greater 
variability in the accuracies of responses and differences 
between controllability conditions. Importantly, we observed 
less accurate performance and higher switching costs for 
the accuracy measure in the control deprivation group, in 
comparison to the control restoration group. An efficiency 
index that accounts for the trade-off between response times 
and accuracies revealed the same pattern of results, addi-
tionally showing the role of stereotype congruency. Namely, 
the benefit from a control restorative experience was most 
pronounced in task conditions that involved double cogni-
tive conflict, that is, when participants were asked to switch 
between tasks and when they were presented with stereo-
type incongruent targets. In fact, after experiencing control 
restoration participants were coping more effectively with 
cognitive conflict, i.e. categorized comparably well when 
exposed to congruent and incongruent gender roles.
As in Experiment 1 we checked the role of reduced 
uncertainty and affective states as factors that are related to 
enhanced flexibility of social categorization. We found the 
same pattern of results for uncertainty assessment, which 
was similar to the control enhancing group that revealed 
a decreased level of experienced uncertainty after control 
restoration. Reduced uncertainty was also accompanied by 
motivational states characteristic for goal completion (i.e. low 
approach positive affect; Gable and Harmon-Jones 2011).6
Experiment 3
In Experiment 2 we found that control restoration can increase 
cognitive flexibility in comparison to stable control depriva-
tion. However, one could argue that since in the control res-
toration (vs. prolonged control deprivation) condition uncon-
trollability was experienced only for a short time (3 vs. 6 
uncontrollable tasks), the lack of control experience in that 
condition may simply not have been strong enough. As a con-
sequence, the obtained effects could be due to the length of the 
uncontrollability experience, rather than the control restoration 
sequence itself. To resolve this, we designed a third experi-
ment, in which the uncontrollability experience was equally 
Fig. 2  Switching costs in exper-
iment 2 (reversed efficiency 
index in ms) as a function of 
uncontrollability and stereotype 
congruency. Error bars repre-
sent 1 standard error
6 We performed an additional mediation analysis to tested whether 
experiencing more positive low-approach emotions in the control 
restoration condition might account for lower switching costs in the 
accuracy measure. To perform this mediation that includes a multi-
categorical independent variable, we used the MEDIATE procedure 
for testing indirect effects (Hayes and Preacher 2014). Bootstrapping 
analyses with 10,000 samples revealed a significant indirect effect of 
control restoration (vs. deprivation) via low-approach positive affect 
on switching costs (IE = 0.003, SE = 0.002, bias-corrected bootstrap 
intervals for 95% level of confidence, CI: 0.001, 0.009). The indirect 
effect of control deprivation vs. control condition contrast was not 
significant (IE = 0.000, SE = 0.001, bias-corrected bootstrap intervals 
for 95% level of confidence, CI: − 0.003, 0.003). Separate mediation 
analyses for positive high-approach emotions and for negative high- 
and low-approach emotions did not reveal any significant indirect 
effects.
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long in both the control restoration and control deprivation 
condition, but the control restoration condition contained addi-
tional control enhancing trials. This design implicates that the 
duration of uncontrollability in control deprivation and control 
restoration conditions is equal but the overall duration of the 
control restoration manipulation is longer. We claim that if 
performance improvement would be observed in this control 
restoration condition, relative to the control deprivation one, 
then it could be argued that this is due to the sequential switch 
from lack of control to control that enhances flexibility, rather 
than due to the uncontrollability experience itself.
Method
Participants
Using the same power calculations as in Study 2 for an 
expected effect size of f = 0.31, to obtain a 0.80 power 
effect, the required sample size is 105 (Faul et al. 2007).7 We 
recruited one hundred-and-thirty-one undergraduate students. 
Four participants did not successfully complete the experi-
mental procedure and were not included in the analyses. Five 
participants were excluded based on manipulation check 
results, which revealed that they perceived the solvable tasks 
in the control condition as unsolvable (three participants) or 
failed to resolve any of the four solvable tasks in the control 
restoration condition (two participants). On the gender-role 
switching task, three participants obtained an accuracy rate 
that was not different from a chance level response tendency 
(one from control deprivation condition: 55% and two from 
control restoration condition: 38% and 57% of overall accu-
rate responses) and could not be included in further analyses. 
The final sample size was therefore one-hundred-nineteen 
(102 females and 17 males, Mage = 21.27, SD = 2.31) and 
consisted of thirty-eight participants in the control condition, 
forty-two in the control deprivation condition and thirty-nine 
in the control restoration condition. All participants, who 
took part in this experiment, received financial compensa-
tion of 10 PLN (approximately $2.50). After completing the 
procedure, they were thanked and debriefed.
Materials and measures
Control manipulation
The type of procedure applied to induce experiences of 
controllability and uncontrollability was the same as in 
Experiment 1 and 2 (IHT; Sedek and Kofta 1990). However, 
in order to maintain an equal number of unsolvable tasks 
in the control deprivation and control restoration condition, 
we modified the amount of solvable and unsolvable tasks 
in each of the conditions. A review of previous literature 
on experimental methods of control deprivation revealed 
that applying only three unsolvable tasks is not a common 
way to induce uncontrollability. Original studies using con-
cept formation tasks applied four unsolvable problems as 
a way of inducing uncontrollability (vs. one unsolvable 
task that served as a “low helplessness” comparison group; 
Mikulincer 1988, 1989). Importantly, the original procedure 
of Informational Helplessness Training applied four unsolv-
able tasks as a way of inducing uncontrollability (Sedek and 
Kofta 1990; von Hecker and Sedek 1999). In some experi-
ments, more than four unsolvable problems were introduced 
in order to examine the effects of prolonged uncontrollability 
and the role of uncertainty and affect in this process (Kofta 
and Sedek 1999; Ric and Scharnitzky 2003; Sedek et al. 
1993). We also referred to the original studies on control 
deprivation in defining the number of tasks for the control 
deprivation group because the manipulation applied on the 
IHT procedure does not contain feedback (unlike the Hiroto 
and Seligman 1975 procedure, which induced behavioral 
and not informational helplessness; see; Sedek and Kofta 
1990), thus participants need a prolonged period of learn-
ing in order to infer the lack of contingency between their 
attempts and results. Therefore, participants in the control 
deprivation condition received four unsolvable problems and 
in the control restoration condition they received the same 
four problems but followed by four solvable ones. We also 
added a control condition, in which participants received 
only four solvable tasks, the same ones that were included 
in the control restoration condition but after the 4 unsolv-
able ones.
Manipulation check
The effectiveness of manipulation was measured by the same 
five questions as in Experiment 2, that concerned the expe-
rienced level of certainty regarding the performance in the 
tasks, perceived difficulty of the tasks, control over one’s 
outcomes, feelings of threat and challenge. Participants 
answered using a 7-point scale (ranging from 1—not at all 
to 7—very much).
Emotions and uncertainty
The participants’ current emotional state after the control 
manipulation was measured using the PANAS scale (Watson 
et al. 1988). We calculated one index for negative affective 
states (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91) and one for positive affec-
tive states (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86). As in Experiment 2, we 
7 We also conducted sensitivity analysis for this. Results show that 
with this sample size (N = 119) the minimum effect size that we can 
detect for α = 0.5, and 1 − β = 0.80, for 3 groups (experimental condi-
tions) and 2 number of measurements is f = 0.29 (minimum detect-
able effect).
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calculated separate indexes for low-approach positive affect 
(interested, inspired, excited, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.71), high-
approach positive affect (active, strong, enthusiastic, proud, 
determined, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85) and two positive affec-
tive states related to alertness (alert, attentive, Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.75). We also measured the level of experienced 
uncertainty after the manipulation (two items: uncertain, 
disoriented, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81).
Gender role switching task (GRST)
We used the same procedure to measure flexibility of switch-
ing between stereotype congruent and incongruent gender 
roles as in Experiment 2. At the end of the experiment, 
an auxiliary measure was administered in order to assess 
participant’s explicit typicality judgments of different gen-
der—profession associations. Participants were thanked and 
debriefed.
Design and data analysis
We followed the same analysis strategy as in Experiment 
1 and 2, focusing on response times, accuracy rates and 
reversed efficiency analyses using a repeated measures 
ANOVA. Again, we mainly focused on the comparisons 
between the control deprivation and restoration group, as 
this comparison was critical for our hypothesis regarding 
the control restorative advantage in flexibility. We also 
compared the effects of control deprivation and restoration 
in contrast to the control group, which in the case of this 
experiment was shorter than in the two previous experi-
ments. The experiment employed a 3 × 2 × 2 mixed design 
with uncontrollability experience manipulated between par-
ticipants (control deprivation vs. control restoration vs. con-
trol), whereas switching (same vs. different categorization 
rule) and congruency (congruent vs. incongruent gender—
role pairings) were measured as within-participant variables. 
Again, switching costs were used as dependent variable.
Results
Manipulation checks
The main effect of control manipulation on perceived con-
trol ratings was significant (F(2,116) = 93.83, p < .001, η2p 
= 0.62). Participants rated their level of perceived personal 
control as higher in the control restoration than in the con-
trol deprivation condition (p < .001, d = 1.74) and lower 
than in the control condition (p < .001, d = − 1.33). We also 
encountered significant effects of manipulation of perceived 
accuracy and difficulty scores (F(2,116) = 110.16, p < .001, 
η2p = 0.66 and F(2,116) = 62.43, p < .001, η2p = 0.52; 
respectively). Participants in the control restoration (vs. 
control deprivation) condition judged being more accurate 
(p < .001, d = 1.94) and experiencing less difficulty when 
doing the tasks (p < .001, d = − 1.40). Additionally, in the 
control restoration condition people rated their perceived 
accuracy as lower than in the control condition (p < .001, 
d = − 1.35, respectively), and assessed perceived difficulty of 
the tasks as higher (p < .001, d = 1.21). Comparing the con-
trol deprivation with the control condition, we found lower 
scores of perceived control and perceived accuracy (p < .001, 
d = − 3.07, and p < .001, d = − 3.35), but higher scores of 
perceived difficulty (p < .001, d = 2.34) when participants 
were deprived of control. The results proved the efficiency 
of the uncontrollability manipulation.
Emotions and uncertainty
The control manipulation significantly influenced expe-
rienced negative and positive emotions (F(2,116) = 6.09, 
p = .003, η2p = 0.10, F(2,116) = 5.30, p = .006, η2p = 0.08; 
respectively). Firstly, we compared the emotional states 
induced by the control restoration vs. control deprivation 
condition and participants did not differ in terms of self-
reported emotional states with respect to negative emotions 
(p = .49, d = − 0.27) nor positive emotions (p = 1). Control 
restoration scores did not differ from the ones obtained in 
the control condition for negative emotions but were sig-
nificantly lower on positive emotions (p = 130, d = 0.53 and 
p = .041, d = − 0.55; respectively). In the control deprivation 
condition participants experiences significantly more nega-
tive and less positive emotions than in the control condition 
(p < .001, d = 0.85 and p = .002, d = − 0.72, respectively). 
The control restoration and deprivation conditions did not 
differ between each other with respect to low-approach 
affect nor high-approach affect (p = 1). Still, both groups 
differed significantly from the control condition in terms 
of high approach affect (interaction effect: F(2,116) = 9.91, 
p < .001, η2p = 0.15), showing less approach related affect 
after control deprivation (p < .001, d = − 0.77) and control 
restoration (p = .002, d = − 0.96). The manipulation affected 
also significantly the level of experienced uncertainty 
(F(2,116) = 14.24, p < .001, η2p = 0.20). In the control res-
toration condition it was significantly lower in comparison 
to the control deprivation condition (p = .008, d = − 0.62). 
Additionally, uncertainty was non-significantly lower in the 
control than in the control restoration condition (p = .091, 
d = − 0.55) and significantly lower in control vs. deprivation 
condition (p < .001, d = − 1.25; for all descriptive statistics 
see Table 1).
Gender role switching task (GRST)
Trials with erroneous and missed responses (i.e., trials in 
which no response was given), or reactions shorter than 200 
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and higher than 2000 ms were excluded from the analysis 
of response times (see Ratcliff 1993).8 The first trial of each 
block for RT and accuracy measures was excluded, since 
it cannot be coded as switch or no switch trial for further 
analyses (see Marzecová et al. 2013). Mean RT and accuracy 
scores were calculated from all the remaining trials.
Effects of  control manipulation The effect of uncontrol-
lability on switching costs in reaction times was not sig-
nificant (F < 1), similarly as the two-way uncontrollability 
× congruency interaction (F(2,116) = 1.29, p = .280, η2p = 
0.02) with switching costs as dependent variable. The main 
effect of uncontrollability on accuracy was not significant 
(F < 1). We also conducted a rANOVA with congruency as 
within-subject factor and uncontrollability as a between-
participants factor on accuracy measures and found again 
a significant uncontrollability x congruency interaction for 
switching costs in accuracies (F(2,116) = 3.66, p = .029, η2p 
= 0.06). Planned comparisons revealed that on incongru-
ent trials switching costs were not significantly lower after 
control restoration (M = 0.013, SD = 0.053) in comparison 
to control deprivation, (M = 0.033, SD = 0.053), p = .11, 
d = − 0.37, and significantly lower in comparison to the con-
trol condition (M = 0.038, SD = 0.057), p = .049, d = − 0.45.
Reversed efficiency analysis Analogous to Experiment 2 
we tested the possibility of a trade-off between response 
time and accuracy in the GRST and therefore calculated an 
index of reversed efficiency by dividing average reaction 
times for each task condition, by the corresponding accu-
racy rates. The overall effect of uncontrollability on switch-
ing costs was not significant (F(2,116) = 1.48, p = .23, η2p 
= 0.03). However, again, a significant uncontrollability × 
congruency interaction was observed, F(2,116) = 3.28, 
p = .041, η2p = 0.05; see Fig. 3. This result replicated the 
one obtained in Experiment 2, in which performance in 
specific experimental conditions depended on congruency 
of presented gender roles. As in Experiment 2, we com-
pared the performance in different uncontrollability condi-
tions separately for stereotype-congruent and incongruent 
trials. A planned comparison analysis performed only for 
the stereotype incongruent trials revealed lower switching 
costs in the control restoration than in the deprivation con-
dition (M = 99, SD = 111; M = 164, SD = 190 respectively), 
p = .052, d = − 0.42, as well as in the control condition 
(M = 168, SD = 135), p = .045, d = − 0.56. Control depriva-
tion and control conditions did not differ significantly from 
each other (p = .90).
Meta‑analysis
An additional mini meta-analysis was conducted to check 
whether the pattern of results showing an advantage in cog-
nitive flexibility after control restoration vs. control depriva-
tion experiences was replicated and also to estimate the size 
of the effect across the three studies (Goh et al. 2016). The 
meta-analysis was conducted using R-software 3.4.1 (2017) 
and the package ‘metafor’ 2.0-0 (Viechtbauer 2010). In this 
meta-analysis we included Cohen’s d effect size measures 
for the comparison between the control restoration and the 
control deprivation condition for all three experiments with 
switching costs as DV since our main predictions concerned 
this comparison. To obtain a full picture of the reliability of 
the observed effects we performed separate meta-analyses 
for switching costs calculated for RTs, accuracy and effi-
ciency scores (Fig. 4).
Fig. 3  Switching costs in exper-
iment 3 (reversed efficiency 
index in ms) as a function of 
uncontrollability and stereotype 
congruency. Error bars repre-
sent 1 standard error
8 RT data in the gender role switching task was normally distributed, 
as indicated by the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test performed for each 
experimental and task condition (all p’s = .13).
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Meta‑analysis for  RT switching costs The heterogeneity of 
the effect sizes was not significant (Q(2) = 2.08, p = .353, 
I2 = 0.00%). The analysis indicated that across the three 
studies, control restoration (vs. deprivation) was signifi-
cantly related to lower switching costs (d = 0.35, p = .018, 
95% CI [0.06, 0.63]).
Meta‑analysis for accuracy switching costs The heterogene-
ity of the effect sizes was significant (Q(2) = 7.92, p = .019, 
I2 = 76.87%). The analysis indicated that across the three 
studies, control restoration (vs. deprivation) was not sig-
nificantly related to change in switching costs (d = 0.19, 
p = .529, 95% CI [− 0.41, 0.80]).
Meta‑analysis for  reversed efficiency switching costs The 
heterogeneity of the effect sizes was not significant 
(Q(2) = 0.10, p = .953, I2 = 0.00%). The analysis indicated 
that across the three studies, control restoration (vs. dep-
rivation) was significantly related to lower switching costs 
(d = 0.40, p = .007, 95% CI [0.11, 0.68]).
Overall, two out of three meta-analyses supported our 
main prediction that control restoration leads to decreased 
switching costs (i.e. higher cognitive flexibility) in compari-
son to stable control deprivation.9
Discussion
In this experiment, we examined the possibility that a shorter 
duration of the uncontrollability period in the control resto-
ration vs. deprivation condition might itself be a factor that 
increases flexibility, independently from the sequential con-
trol restoration experience. In order to clarify this issue, we 
compared a control restoration condition that consisted of 
the same number of unsolvable tasks as the control depriva-
tion one (before the solvable tasks sequence). This simulated 
the situation of sequential control restoration providing a 
stronger test for our main hypothesis that the mere sequence 
of control restoration and not the duration of uncontrollabil-
ity experiences, boosts cognitive flexibility.
The results revealed differences between control restora-
tion and deprivation on the switching measure for accuracy 
and efficiency scores in task conditions that evoke additional 
Fig. 4  Meta-analysis of the three experiments for switching costs in: A reaction time, B accuracy and C reversed efficiency results
9 Meta-analyses for the effects of comparisons between control depri-
vation and control conditions are placed in Supplementary Materials.
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cognitive conflict, replicating the finding from Experiment 
2. As previously seen, higher levels of cognitive flexibil-
ity (assessing switching costs for accuracy and efficiency 
measures) were more pronounced when participants had to 
switch between categorization rules while being exposed 
to stereotype incongruent gender roles. Therefore, it is not 
the length of control depriving experiences but the possibil-
ity to regain control that accounts for the enhanced level of 
flexibility in the control restoration condition. In fact, the 
entire experience of control loss and recuperation was longer 
than the one of control loss only and despite of that it still 
led to better performance, which suggests that participants 
benefit from the change of experiences (the lack of control 
to control sequence) and not just from a shorter period of 
uncontrollability. This conclusion obtained additional sup-
port from a meta-analysis performed on the data from all 
three experiments that revealed improved social category 
switching abilities after control restoration (vs. deprivation) 
experiences for reaction times and efficiency scores.
Additionally, we found that the duration of experienced 
controllability, also played an important role and influenced 
overall cognitive performance. Specifically, we found simi-
lar levels of performance in control and control depriva-
tion conditions even though those two conditions differed in 
terms of subjectively experienced control, certainty, as well 
as positive and negative emotions. It is important to notice 
that in this experiment, the control enhancing experience 
and the control depriving experience was limited to four 
tasks. Thus, shorter periods of control deprivation seemed 
to lead to a weaker impairment of cognitive flexibility. This 
finding is consistent with the cognitive exhaustion model of 
uncontrollability (Sedek and Kofta 1990, see also; Bukowski 
and Kofta 2017), which assumes, that only prolonged and 
repeated experiences of control loss lead to deficits in cog-
nitive performance, especially involving executive atten-
tional functions. In fact, shorter periods of uncontrollability 
might enhance motivation, alternate the cognitive style, but 
there is no empirical evidence that they would indeed boost 
performance that involves cognitive control. Instead, a lin-
ear decrease of cognitive performance as a function of the 
length of control deprivation was previously observed (Ric 
and Scharnitzky 2003). The findings of this study are in 
line with this claim that reduced length of uncontrollabil-
ity experiences influences cognitive performance to a lesser 
degree. At the same time, it could be argued that shorter 
control enhancing experiences are not sufficient to learn, 
accumulate an experience of having control and increase the 
participant’s level of performance on a subsequent cogni-
tive task. However, what can be observed here more clearly 
than in the previous studies is that the same length of con-
trol deprivation when combined with subsequent control 
enhancing experiences boosts performance by reducing the 
costs of switching between social categories in comparison 
to both groups that contained experiences of stability, either 
of uncontrollability or control.
This study revealed some interesting patterns of results 
with regard to the motivational processes involved in con-
trol restoration. Participants in control restoration and con-
trol deprivation conditions, despite the clear differences in 
cognitive flexibility, reported similar levels of approach-
based affect, which for both groups was lower than the one 
observed when personal control was enhanced. Thus, the 
results obtained in the previous studies which revealed more 
positive affect (including positive low-approach affect in 
Study 2) in control restoration than deprivation condition 
might be due to the fact that in the present study a longer 
period of uncontrollability was induced in the control res-
toration condition and a shorter period of uncontrollabil-
ity was induced in the control deprivation condition. This 
change perhaps made the two conditions more similar in 
terms of experienced affective states but not in terms of 
performance.10 More importantly, the groups also differed 
in perceived uncertainty. As in Study 1 and 2, participants 
in this study experienced lower levels of uncertainty in the 
control restoration condition than those in the stable control 
deprivation condition, which suggests that decreased level 
of uncertainty is an important aspect of a control restoration 
experience.
General discussion
Previous research investigating the effects of control depri-
vation on cognition focused largely on performance deficits 
caused by prolonged and stable experiences of uncontrol-
lability (see Bukowski and Kofta 2017; Kofta and Sedek 
1998; Sedek and Kofta 1990; von Hecker and Sedek 1999). 
In the present research, we started out with Brehm’s (1993) 
observation that organisms exhibit great variability and 
flexibility in their abilities to restore control. We found that 
humans were indeed able to act flexibly when control dep-
rivation experiences were unstable, that is, when lack of 
control experiences were followed by controllable events. 
These findings are in line with a view of human agency, 
which proposes that situational factors can enable various 
coping mechanisms with uncontrollability, or even encour-
age expressions of personal control (Bukowski et al. 2017; 
Swann and Jetten 2017). Importantly, while previous stud-
ies focused mainly on investigating the effects of control 
deprivation in non-social contexts, our study demonstrated 
that uncontrollability can also influence processing of social 
10 An analogical mediation analysis as in Experiment 2 testing indi-
rect effects of control restoration (vs. deprivation) via low approach 
positive affect on switching costs did not yield significance.
30 Motivation and Emotion (2019) 43:12–34
1 3
categories. This aspect is very important since humans being 
social animals, often experience control deprivation in rela-
tion to others and also change their perceptions of others as 
a result of experienced uncontrollability. Our research brings 
to forefront three main insights: (1) a realization that the 
impact of control deprivation on cognitive flexibility is mod-
ulated by stability of such experiences, (2) that uncertainty 
reduction, approach-based motivation and positive affective 
states can together drive these effects of flexibility enhance-
ment and (3) an awareness that control restoration experi-
ences can subsequently increase switching abilities between 
social categories. In the discussion below, we would like to 
focus on these main and novel aspects of this research.
(In)stability of control deprivation and cognitive 
flexibility
What is substantial for detrimental effects of control depri-
vation on cognition is the consistent accumulation of expe-
riences that reveal lack of contingency between intentions 
and actions (for a review see Bukowski and Kofta 2017). 
Consistently with this assumption, a sequence of uncontrol-
lable events that is disrupted and substituted by controllable 
ones can not only prevent those cognitive deficits from tak-
ing place, but also immunize against future, possible periods 
of control loss. This “immunization” could be observed in 
our research in the form of improved cognitive adaptation to 
conflictive environmental demands. Specifically, participants 
after experiencing control restoration were not as susceptible 
to incongruent information (involving social stereotypes) as 
their counterparts who experienced only control deprivation. 
In the light of previous research that revealed more rigid 
and biased processing after threats to control, our findings 
showed conditions in which control depriving experiences 
promote more flexible processing strategies. Similarly, Whit-
son and Galinsky (2008) showed that the impact of lack 
of control on illusory pattern perception can be diminished 
after self-affirmation. Yet, another important factor that 
modulates the impact of uncontrollability experiences on 
flexibility, apart from their stability, is the length of this 
experience. This factor that was studied in previous research 
on control deprivation seems to have a cumulative, linear 
detrimental impact on cognitive performance, and cogni-
tive flexibility, based on our findings, does not seem to be 
an exception from that pattern (Mikulincer 1994; Ric and 
Scharnitzky 2003).
The role of uncertainty and approach‑based positive 
affect in boosting flexibility
What was not entirely clear is the process underlying the 
effects of control restoration on cognitive flexibility. In the 
introduction, we pointed out two possible processes—one 
more cognitive related to the role of environmental uncer-
tainty and the second, motivational, related to reward pro-
cessing and approach-based positive affective states. On 
one hand, changing task solvability that leads to evoked 
and reduced uncertainty seemed to play an important role 
in boosting flexibility (in all three studies the level of uncer-
tainty was reduced in the control restoration group in com-
parison to the control deprivation one), on the other hand, 
we obtained mixed evidence for the importance of affec-
tive processes. Thus, it could be argued with certain cau-
tion that a sudden withdrawal of uncertainty related to the 
missing contingency between intentions and actions could 
have influenced the performance on a consecutive switch-
ing task. The mechanism might resemble the one of conflict 
adaptation, which shows that after exposure to incongru-
ent trials the congruency effect (i.e. more efficient process-
ing of congruent vs. incongruent trials in a task) is reduced 
(Kleiman et al. 2014). We observed that costs related to 
switching are reduced when participants previously expe-
rienced a change in the predicted solvability of the tasks 
they performed. Abilities to shift between mental sets seem 
to be more adaptive especially in uncertain environments 
(Nederhof et al. 2014). Knowing that prolonged experi-
ence of uncontrollability impairs one’s ability to select goal 
relevant from irrelevant information and evokes a sense of 
high behavioral uncertainty (related to response selection; 
Bukowski and Kofta 2017), shifting to a different response 
strategy might be a crucial ability in overcoming the detri-
mental effects of control deprivation. Paradoxically, uncer-
tain and unstable environments can provide the opportunity 
for learning and enhance task motivation by undermining 
the perceived stability of lacking control and the tendency 
to prescribe deficits in control to one’s own self-efficacy. 
Interestingly, recent research on unpredictable environ-
ments, showed that individuals who as children experienced 
unpredictability in the family home, were better in cogni-
tive switching but the same effect was not found in those 
who experienced long-term hardship and poverty (Mittal 
et al. 2015). This finding is consistent with a more general 
observation that highly unusual life experiences (so called 
“diversifying experiences”) can be linked to increased flex-
ible thinking and creativity (Gocłowska et al. 2017). Our 
results resemble those of Mittal et al. (2015) by showing that 
when uncontrollable conditions are mixed with subsequent 
controllable ones, the ability to switch between categories is 
improved, and especially so, in more uncertain (expectancy-
incongruent) conditions.
Still, approach-based positive affect seemed to play 
also an important role in driving the effects of more effi-
cient task-switching after control restoration. The data 
we collected on subjective and phenomenal experiences 
measures suggested that low approach affect arose only 
when the periods of preliminary control deprivation were 
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shorter and the entire manipulation was less cognitively 
demanding. Previous research showed that threats to per-
sonal control induced approach based motivational states 
(Greenaway et al. 2015). We did not find higher approach 
after longer lasting experiences of control deprivation 
(i.e. already after four unsolvable tasks) but short term or 
unstable experiences of control loss seemed to be related 
to approach-based motivational states. In fact, prolonged 
periods of control deprivation lead to a general affective 
deficit (a mixture of negative emotions, one of the criti-
cal symptoms of the learned helplessness syndrome) that 
could trigger inaction and reactive depression (Hiroto and 
Seligman 1975; Kofta and Sędek 1989; Roth and Kubal 
1975; Sedek and Kofta 1990).
Integrating these two, complementary explanations, why 
control restoration modulates cognitive flexibility, we think 
that reduced uncertainty could play an important motiva-
tional role. This might occur because uncertainty reduction 
is by itself rewarding and leading to the activation of low 
approach positive affective states (like relaxation or interest 
related to anticipated goal completion; Gable and Harmon-
Jones 2011). Also, the probability of success in the control 
restoration condition can be judged as higher, since partici-
pants experience a shift in their solvability, which in turn 
could serve as a rewarding experience inducing a positive 
affective state and mobilizing effort (Richter and Gendolla 
2009). Thus, moderate levels of uncertainty related to chang-
ing, unclear task solvability might be also an important moti-
vational mechanism that leads to increased expenditure of 
cognitive effort and performance.
Not only success probability seems to matter though for 
performance but also the length of control depriving experi-
ence. In shorter control deprivation experiences approach-
based affect is an important factor that boosts flexible, or 
cognitively “open” cognitive processing (Harmon-Jones 
et al. 2013). Still, control restoration experiences that are 
more stretched in time and include longer periods of con-
trol depriving and restoring events can diminish the role 
of positive approach-related affect and maintain the benefi-
cial motivational effects of uncertainty reduction. This is of 
course only a speculative explanation and in future research, 
systematic control for the length of uncontrollable experi-
ences should be applied.
Also, the carry over effects on subsequent tasks that 
involve different cognitive functions would need to be 
explored in depth. A novel strand of research demonstrates 
the effects of motivation on enhanced cognitive control but 
examining it in a trial-by-trial and contextual (block-based) 
manner (Botvinick and Braver 2015). Our research provides 
preliminary findings that a motivating experience can have 
sequential carry-over effects also on a task-by-task basis. 
We believe that further research is needed to pinpoint the 
specific motivational mechanisms underlying the beneficial 
effects of restored personal control on cognitive flexibility.
Socially relevant consequences of control loss 
and restoration
The last but not least important highlight of our research is 
that it places the effects of control deprivation and restora-
tion in the context of switching between social categories. 
Previous research on the effects of threatened personal con-
trol focused mainly on various negative consequences for 
social perception. Several findings showed that after con-
trol deprivation people exhibited an increased tendency to 
rely on illusory perceptions of structure as exemplified in 
beliefs in superstitions or conspiracies (Whitson and Gal-
insky 2008). In fact, searching for structure, contingencies 
and fixed rules in the environment might itself be consid-
ered as different forms of coping with control threat which 
are related to a more avoidance based motivational state. 
However, fluctuations of control loss and restoration can 
also lead to a more flexible processing style that boosts the 
motivation and ability to shift between different levels of 
social categorization. Our research highlights this brighter 
side of control loss dynamics, by showing that when threat 
to control is activated and then withdrawn, then this state of 
instability might paradoxically promote more flexible social 
perception of others. In such cases people can move from a 
more habitual and mindless state to a deliberate and mind-
ful processing mode (Louis and Sutton 1991). Most impor-
tantly, our research provided some preliminary evidence for 
the claim that an unstable environment related to a restored 
sense of control can promote a more flexible way of cat-
egorizing others. We think that this enhanced flexible style 
of person categorization (i.e. open for certain malleability 
of conceptual boundaries) might be an adaptive response 
related to unstable uncontrollability.
Limitations
One possible weakness of the research presented here is that 
significant results supporting our main prediction regarding 
the flexibility enhancing control restoration experience were 
present on different dependent measures across the three 
experiments. More specifically, Experiment 1 revealed a 
significant pattern for RTs but not for accuracies or the effi-
ciency scores, Experiment 2 revealed the strongest effects 
for accuracies and efficiency scores, whereas the results 
from Experiment 3 showed only a tendency in the predicted 
direction for accuracy and efficiency scores. The effects were 
more pronounced when additional cognitive conflict was 
present in the task. Nevertheless, a meta-analysis performed 
on the three experiments provided evidence for the predicted 
effect of control restoration (vs. control deprivation) on 
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reduced switching costs for the reaction time and reversed 
efficiency measures, but not for the accuracy measures. Lack 
of effects for the accuracy score might be due to lack of sig-
nificant results on this variable in Experiment 1, in which 
no trade-off between RT and accuracy could be observed, 
unlike in the following experiments that used a different 
task-switching procedure. Another limitation of this research 
might be based on the moderately under-powered results 
from Experiment 1.
Conclusion
In sum, our studies demonstrated that various uncontrol-
lability experiences can impair or enhance flexibility of 
switching between social categories, depending on the sta-
bility of control deprivation experiences. Therefore, expo-
sure to uncontrollability experiences that vary in stability 
and dynamics do not necessarily have to lead to negative 
social consequences (e.g. reliance on stereotypes), as it 
could also trigger higher cognitive flexibility. The experi-
ence of regaining control seems to provide a motivational 
and cognitive boost that prevails over the detrimental effects 
of control loss. Future research should focus more directly 
on the dynamics of control loss and restoration to obtain a 
deeper understanding of the causes that lead to diverse con-
sequences of uncontrollability on thought and action.
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